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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to analyze the influence of gender diversity on the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance (CG) and economic and financial performance of 
Brazilian publicly traded companies.  
Design/methodology/approach – The sample comprises 68 non-financial public companies comprising 
the IBX100 index of BM&FBOVESPA. For that, it was used panel data modeling, correlation and ranking by 
TOPSIS method.  
Findings – The results suggest a significant relationship between CG and economic–financial performance 
when mediated by gender diversity. This relationship was not observed between CSR and economic–financial 
performance. Thus, it can be concluded that in a diversified board of directors, in terms of gender, better 
monitoring of managers can occur because of the increase in their independence in decisions, as well as 
performance increase. These results diverge from the literature on the influence of women’s participation in 
corporate boards in CSR. It is assumed that this result is because of the fact that the participation of women is 
recent in Brazil.  
Research limitations/implications – The main limitations are the number of companies 
analyzed, the choice of ISE index to verify the CSR variable and the metric used to verify the CG 
mechanisms.  
Originality/value – In general, this research contributes to the literature of the area, especially in Brazil, in 
confirming that the mediating variable gender diversity makes the relationship between CG and performance 
more significant. 
Keywords Performance, Social responsibility, Governance, Gender 
Paper type Research paper 
1. Introduction 
The corporate governance (CG) as an investor protection mechanism has become an 
important issue for financial markets after significant flaws related to accounting fraud. 
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Therefore, investors are demanding that companies deploy strict CG principles to maximize 
returns on investments and reduce agency costs (Beiner et al., 2006; Aras and Crowther, 
2008). 
The lack of research on the impact of other CG structures in CSR reports is, according Jizi 
et al. (2014), an indication of a mental disconnection between what is considered “good 
corporate governance” and how to ensure that companies, in a transparent manner, meet 
their social obligations to society. In this context, several studies have sought to investigate 
the relationship between intangible resources, such as gender diversity (Aguinis and 
Glavas, 2012), CG (Jamali et al., 2007; Margem, 2013), CSR (Bear et al., 2010) and economic– 
financial performance (Bear et al., 2010). However, Margem (2013) argues that in Brazil, this 
issue is still little studied because of lack of data. 
The Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) (IBGC, 2011) considers that 
gender diversity on boards is a recent theme in the CG discussions in Brazil, but it begins to 
gain momentum, as some countries adopt compulsory rules or voluntary adhesions to 
female presence in senior management. 
In a review of 588 published articles on CSR, Aguinis and Glavas (2012) provide insights 
into the use of intangible assets that include gender diversity as mediators of the 
relationship between CSR and financial performance. Several studies have confirmed that 
the positive impact of gender diversity on boards is linked to better classification of 
companies on the CSR and corporate reputation, as well as financial performance, 
institutional investment and stock price (Fombrun, 2006; Bear et al., 2010). 
The diversity of gender can affect the monitoring function of the management board. 
Having more women on the board enhances the experience of this, increasing the range 
of professional experience (Hillman et al., 2002). While increasing the representation of 
women on boards is still a long process (Bear et al., 2010), gender diversity on the board 
can help to ensure effective organizational control (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Bear 
et al., 2010). 
Bear et al. (2010) state that the increase in the number of women on corporate boards can 
improve CSR and provide important signals to investors about the potential for improving 
the reputation and financial performance of companies. It is noteworthy that in 2011 about 
66.3 per cent of Brazilian listed companies had no women on their boards. On the other hand, 
those companies that include the presence of women occupy 20 per cent of the chairs of 
boards. When comparing the percentage among countries, among the companies that have 
at least one woman on the board, Brazil found itself behind countries like China, India and 
Russia (IBGC, 2011). 
By addressing future trends to the literature on governance and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), Strandberg (2005) argues that in the future the procedures and 
governance structures should include policies and reviews aimed at disclosure of the nature 
and frequency of CSR practices developed by companies. There are still research gaps that 
need to be discussed, such as, the effect of mediation and intangible variables and the 
separation of analysis variables at individual and institutional level (Frooman, 1997; 
Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009; Aguinis and Glavas, 
2012). 
Parente and Machado Filho (2013) have pointed out that in the context of Brazilian 
companies, CSR practices are dispersed and are not always part of the CG. They suggest 
that future research studies should invest in three areas: the importance of the institutional 
environment in promoting CSR and CG, the influence of the concepts of organizational 
performance and the role of councils and counselors in the CSR promotion (Parente and 
Machado Filho, 2013). 
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Within this context, the following research question arises: 
RQ1. What is the influence of gender diversity in the relationship between CSR, CG and 
financial performance of Brazilian public companies? 
Thus, this research aims to analyze the influence of gender diversity in the relationship 
between CSR, the CG and the financial performance of Brazilian public companies. 
The study is justified by the importance of the topic for literature, for investors and the 
community in general, as gender diversity in board positions and directors may represent a 
differential in terms of CG practices (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), performance (Oba and 
Fodio, 2013) and actions aimed at CSR (Hillman et al., 2000; Bear et al., 2010); especially for 
national literature, since the paucity of research in this area. 
In view of the findings of similar studies (Hillman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Bear et al., 2010; Oba and Fodio, 2013), it is assumed that the inclusion of 
the mediating variable, gender diversity, supposedly would make the relationship between 
CSR, the CG and the most significant performance. It is argued, therefore, that greater 
participation of women in top positions, or greater gender diversity, is a trend and a 
necessary condition to improved financial performance, as CG mechanisms are present and 
adequately meet the principles set by IBGC, including especially the CSR. 
2. Theoretical foundation 
2.1 Corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and performance 
The concept of CSR is relatively modern and after the publication of the book entitled Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman (Bowen, 1953), which questioned the reasonableness of 
the business decision-making, many other articles on the subject were launched (Carroll, 
1979; Lee, 2008; Freguete et al., 2015). 
According to Lee (2008), the dominant theme in the 1950s and 1960s was the ethical and 
social obligation of companies in a normative tone based on Bowen (1953), as it refers to the 
obligations of businessmen following lines of actions that are desirable in terms of goals and 
values to society. In the 1970s, with a tone of reconciliation between social and economic 
interests of companies (Wallich and Mcgowan, 1970), it was recognized that CSR should be 
consistent with the interests of shareholders, otherwise it will be questionable. With this, it 
goes on to provide a new logic that defends the CSR without compromising the interests of 
shareholders (Lee, 2008). 
In the 1980s, Carroll (1979) addressed the model of performance as being consisted of a 
tripod (Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991). This implies, at first, social responsibility 
that addresses a range of issues in the economic, legal or voluntary measures. Second, it is 
related to social issues, on which the company has responsibilities, such as discrimination, 
product safety and the environment. Third, it is concerned with the philosophy or social 
responsiveness of the company (Carroll, 1979). Even in the 1980s, the concepts included 
business ethics, corporate philanthropy, social policy, stakeholder management and the 
beginning of the theories of sustainable development, corporate citizenship, corporate 
sustainability, corporate reputation and socially responsible investment, among other terms 
(Madrakhimova, 2013). 
Since the 1980s, CG has attracted interest from investors, accountants and government 
as an option for resolving disputes between the agent and the principal, with a view of 
managing and improving the related shareholders’ investment performance (De Carvalho, 
2002; Aras and Crowther, 2008; Darus and Mohamad, 2011). 
After the corporate scandals post Eron, around the 2000s, control mechanisms had been 
developed aiming to minimize accounting maneuvers, transparency in business operations 
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and to avoid involvement of managers in fraud. Among these control mechanisms are 
included independent audits, CSR and financial transparency (Gill, 2008; Jin and Drozdenko, 
2010). 
Thus, to establish mechanisms for monitoring managers, CG reduces the agency conflict 
and raises performance. However, according to Bozec et al. (2010), relationship studies 
between governance and performance in the post Eron period proved conflicting. In 
emerging countries, economies in transition, and in Europe, such surveys were consistent in 
which a positive relationship is generally found between CG practices and the company’s 
performance, but showed contrary results in the USA where this relationship was not 
always observed. One possible explanation for these mixed results may lie in the different 
contexts of these nations, such as in emerging countries, where legal and cultural 
constraints are weak in their interaction with corporate behavior, compared with the 
developed countries. Therefore, company samples from these countries are more likely to 
find variations between CG practices and their outcomes (Bozec et al., 2010). 
Social responsibility is related to the CG because for a company to be socially 
responsible, it should practice governance and take into account the investor’s, employees’, 
suppliers’, consumers’, governments’ and the third sector’s wishes. The CG and CSR 
companies share many common characteristics that are likely to promote good CG and at 
the same time, a better CSR (Gonzalez, 2002; Ferreira, 2004; Szab�o and Sorensen, 2013). 
The survival of a company is affected not only by shareholders but also by other 
stakeholders such as employees, customers and governments (Lee, 2008). Thus, the concepts 
institutionalized by CSR during the past 40 years have changed substantially. CSR is no 
longer conceived as a moral responsibility of corporate managers, or a discretionary expense 
of executives that can harm the profitability of a company, but as a strategic resource to be 
used to improve the organization’s performance (Mcwilliams et al., 2006; Lee, 2008). 
The quality of good governance now has a moral cooperative and behavioral ethic 
significantly expressed in the mechanisms of responsibilities, transparency and disclosure. 
That being, the conceptual focus of the governance has now been changed to an ample focus 
that involves stakeholders, shareholders and non-shareholders. In this vision, the 
stakeholders are groups and individuals who can affect and or are affected by the strategic 
result of a company considered the most influential to determine the corporate performance 
and include the clients, collaborators, suppliers, funders and communities (Jones and Wicks, 
1999; Gill, 2008; Harrison and Coombs, 2012); Upon this scenario, lined up with the objective 
of this research, the next topic will show the theoretical support used in the development of 
the hypothesis established. 
2.2 Development of hypotheses 
Among the studies that have sought to relate CSR and performance, some such as Orlitzky 
et al. (2003), Tsoutsoura (2008), Choi et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2015) found a positive 
relationship between CSR and the performance of Brazilian companies; as to Chrysostom 
et al. (2009), and Makni et al. (2009) found a negative impact. It should be noted that, the 
research studies look to measure the development of two lines of investigation that can be 
used in the financial development or the economic development. Therefore, this research is 
about the development inside a multidimensional vision, according to previous studies. 
While realizing an analysis about the CSR and the financial development in 52 articles, 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) verify that the CSR is mostly correlated to be based on financial 
development rather than market indicators. 
With regard to the relation of the CSR with the financial development, Tsoutsoura (2008) 
verified in a sample with 441 companies owned by the S&P 500, from 1996 to 2000, that the 
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CSR is positively related with a better financial development, seeing that the companies that 
have a solid financial development have more resources available to invest on the domains 
of social development, such as the workers relations, precaution toward nature and 
community relation. In that same line of investigation, but another sample with 1,222 
Korean companies, from 2002 to 2008, Choi et al. (2010) used as a measurement for the 
financial development, ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q and found a positive relation between the 
financial development, the CSR and the companies. 
But recently, the analysis realized by Wang et al. (2015), about the CSR and the financial 
development in 42 articles published between 2003 and 2013, suggests a positive effect 
between the variables, in a sense that this relation be stronger in companies that belong to 
developed economies rather than developing ones. 
In the context of the 100 biggest companies in Brazil with an open capital, Almeida- 
Santos et al. (2013) analyzed the relation between the economic development and the 
corporate social reputation and argued that: 
Since some companies investigated already are in the international market, the social reputation 
corporate could be a strategy utilized to better the return of their actions and consequentially the 
expansion of their business (Almeida-Santos et al., 2013, p. 17). 
It presupposes that companies adhere to CSR practices because of instrumental reasons, 
such as the expected financial results and internal values, and that there is a positive 
relationship between CSR actions, policies and financial results (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). 
Expected results were similar to the studies of Orlitzky et al. (2003), Tsoutsoura (2008), Choi 
et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2015), who found a positive relationship between CSR and 
financial performance. From the foregoing by literature, the following hypotheses supported 
the relationship between CSR and economic and financial performance of Brazilian 
companies: 
H1. CSR is positively related to the economic performance of companies. 
H2. CSR is positively related to financial performance of companies. 
In a second moment, the relationship of the CG with the performance of Brazilian companies 
is researched. The study by Silveira (2004) reinforces the idea that a higher quality of CG has 
a positive impact on the value and profitability of companies. However, among the 
performance variables tested in the study, Tobin’s Q was the only one that showed a 
positive relationship. Previous studies, such as Larcker et al. (2007), Correia et al. (2011), 
Brenes et al. (2011) found that CG characteristics are associated with the better performance 
of Brazilian companies. 
Studies realized by Judge et al. (2003) in 45 Russian companies and by Silveira et al. 
(2003) in the Brazilian publicly traded companies conclude that a better structured 
governance leads to a better development of the companies. 
While analyzing this relation in a sample of 495 companies in 25 emerging countries, 
Klapper and Love (2004) verified that there is great variation in the levels of adoption and 
the levels of CG between the countries and that the adoption is weaker in countries with a 
weak legal system. Generally, they conclude that a better CG is highly correlated with a 
better operational development and the business market. 
However, Politelo (2013), while analyzing the national literature on the relationship 
between governance and performance, had not yet achieved a consensus on what 
mechanisms are members of the CG and what is its real effect on the performance of 
Brazilian companies. 
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It is suggested that the companies considered sustainable must possess certain 
characteristics or determinants of CG to achieve a favorable financial and environmental 
performance, namely, social and environmental investments, such as, mechanisms and 
measures to reduce the environmental impact (Waddock and Graves,1997); company size; 
presence of multinational subsidiaries (Kolk, 2008); intangible assets, for example, best 
management practices, product quality, operational efficiency, attractiveness for investors, 
gender and ethnic variety (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012); diversity in the board composition 
(Rao and Tilt, 2013); independence; and board size (Jizi et al., 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are tested: 
H3. The CG is positively related to the economic performance of companies. 
H4. The CG is positively related to the financial performance of companies. 
Regarding the variable gender diversity, it is taken as a premise that the presence of women 
on the board can have a positive impact on social capital and social responsibility of 
companies because of higher rate of specialization, support and influence for the community 
(Hillman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2010). It would be more sensitive to CSR 
initiatives such as charity (Williams, 2003), more favorable work environments (Bernardi 
et al., 2006) and environmental issues (Post et al., 2011). The presence of women on corporate 
boards can signal to stakeholders that the company pays attention to women and minorities, 
and therefore is socially responsible (Bear et al., 2010). It is assumed that companies having 
women holding positions in corporate boards and participating in environmental rankings 
as the ISE (corporate sustainability index [CSI]) are more likely to develop best CSR 
practices, just like they influence positively the general corporation development. 
Empirical research found evidence of a positive correlation between the proportion of 
women and corporate performance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Hussein and 
Kiwia, 2009; Oba and Fodio, 2013). On the other hand, other studies found no significant 
relationship or the relationship found was negative (Shrader et al., 1997; Rose, 2007; Rand, 
2013), because other variables beyond gender diversity may have interfered with the 
performance, such as qualifications and experience (Almeida-Santos et al., 2013). 
Internationally, according to the studies done by Bear et al. (2010) with a sample of 689 
US companies confirmed that the increase in the number of women on corporate boards can 
improve CSR. Investigating the relation of the mixture of gender in the council and the 
financial development in 100 Nigerian companies, using the return indicators about the 
capital employed (ROCE) as a measure on the financial development and the presence of a 
female director, proportion of women in the administration, Blau’s index of heterogeneity 
and the mix of gender in council, Oba and Fodio (2013) reinforce the arguments that both the 
feminine presence in administration and the proportion of women in council have positive 
impacts in the financial development. 
In the Brazilian context, when analyzing the influence of the feminine participation in the 
councils of administration about the performance of 120 Brazilian companies, in the period 
between 2010 and 2013, Silva Júnior and Martins (2017) verified that the companies with a 
higher gender diversity showed a better development, captured by Tobin’s Q and by ROA, 
that being, a feminine presence influenced positively in the financial development. 
When analyzing 658 of the companies opened in Brazil in the period between 2002 and 
2009, Margem (2013) confirmed a positive relation between the diversity of gender and the 
CSR. Sustained on this theoretical approach, it is assumed that the relationship between the 
CSR and the performance becomes stronger when mediated by gender diversity of Brazilian 
companies. Therefore, the hypotheses of this research are as follows: 
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H5. The gender diversity explains the positive relationship between CSR and economic 
performance of companies. 
H6. The gender diversity explains the positive relationship between CSR and financial 
performance of companies. 
Given the growing demand for transparency and expectations for corporations to 
continuously measure, report and improve economic, social and environmental performance 
(Tsoutsoura, 2008), CG mechanisms are introduced to assist in the monitoring and 
relationship process of information users. 
A good CG structure can be understood when it stimulates more capable managers and 
make them more accountable to investors. Empirical evidence suggests that improved 
financial performance may result from the increased presence of women on boards 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000; Francoeur et al., 2008). 
In some countries like Belgium, it is discussed the establishment of quotas for women in 
the public office and administration councils in the private sector by means of law projects 
that focus on equality and democracy. It is considered that the councils that are balanced in 
terms of gender and diversity have better decision-making process and, with that being, the 
efficiency of the company. In the case of the companies financed by the state, the democratic 
principles of representation should apply to the council. This parts from the assumption that 
the lack of women in the council is a sign that the gender inequality in the business market 
and quotas are considered as a policy used to correct this error, because women have the 
same democratic right to be equally represented in these councils. Another argument 
concerns the difference between female and male wages, but with the inclusion of more 
women on the company board, it will contribute to the narrowing of the difference between 
wages and women’s independence (Celis, 2013). 
In a council of more diverse administration, there may be a better monitoring of 
managers because of the increase of their independence (Carter et al., 2010) and performance 
(Kin et al., 2009). Thus, the greater the diversity of the board, the greater the potential for 
understanding and solving problems that can promote positive reviews (Hillman et al., 2000; 
Bear et al., 2010). The CG literature states that women attend more meetings and are more 
likely to be assigned to monitoring committees than men. If women participate actively in 
council meetings and the follow-up committee, they could increase the monitoring intensity 
of the council (Adams and Ferreira, (2009). 
Councils with more female members are characterized by the potential for greater 
participation of the directors in decision-making (through attendance and attributions by 
the committees), by a more rigorous monitoring of the CEO (through greater sensitivity to 
the volume of business and performance) and an alignment with the interests of the 
shareholders (through compensation based on actions). Therefore, excessive monitoring can 
decrease the value of the company, although councils with more gender diversity seem more 
valuable to companies with a weak governance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Thus, it is claimed that the premise of the presence of women in executive positions could 
lead to better CG in organizations (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), although national studies 
have considered only variables related to the administration board for measuring the CG 
(Margem, 2013). 
The diversity on the board can also increase the network ties (Beckman and Haunschild, 
2002) (Hillman et al., 2000) with suppliers, customers, professional associations, banking 
networks, commercials, government agencies, community groups and nonprofit 
organizations. These networks can provide suggestions and experience, as well as promote 
cooperation with stakeholders (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Bear et al., 2010). 
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Several studies have sought to investigate the understanding of the various aspects of 
the CG, including the effectiveness of the board of directors, their roles, responsibilities and 
composition of the boards, especially the size of the gender diversity and female 
representation on them (Hyland and Marcellino, 2002; Burke, 2003; Jamali et al., 2007). 
Recent studies confirm the relationship between gender diversity, GC and performance, an 
example by Erhardt et al. (2003), Carter et al. (2003) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008). 
While analyzing the CG, gender diversity in the directory and the value of the companies 
listed in the Fortune 1000, Carter et al. (2003) confirm the relationship between both 
variables. The diversity of the directory was defined by the percentage of women, African– 
Americans, Asians and other minorities that belonged to the administration council. Also 
considering other CG measures, positive and significant relationships were found between 
the presence of women or minorities in the council and the value of the company using 
Tobin’s Q. In general, the results of these authors provide important evidence of a positive 
relationship between the value of a company and the diversity in the administration council. 
One of the first studies that analyzed Spanish companies, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) evaluated through a chance test to see if the feminine participation in the council 
really affects the performance of a company or if companies with greater performance are 
simply prone to hiring more women. Results show that the positive relationship observed 
between the diversity of gender and the value of a company is because of the presence of 
female directors that affect the performance of a company and not the opposite. 
In an interview with managers of Lebanese companies, Jamali et al. (2007) found that 
most managers and mid-level female managers believed that one of the alternatives to 
improve performance would be to introduce new government regulations, in line with CG 
practices at the international level to address the underrepresentation of women in 
influential positions and board. Therefore, based on the literature that supports this view, 
the research hypotheses are as follows: 
H7. The gender diversity explains the positive relationship between the CG and the 
economic performance of companies. 
H8. The gender diversity explains the positive relationship between the CG and the 
financial performance of companies. 
It is expected to find a positive relationship between CSR and CG, mediated by gender 
diversity in economic and financial performance of the analyzed companies, as there are 
studies that have confirmed this relationship previously. The variables and their 
relationship with the hypotheses of this study are shown in Figure 1. 
3. Method and procedures of research 
3.1 Population and sample 
The population of this research included the companies belonging to IBrX 100 BM and 
FBOVESPA, which measures the return on a theoretical portfolio composed by 100 
stocks selected amongst the most traded on the BM&FBOVESPA, in terms of number of 
trades and financial value. From this list, financial companies, resulting in 76 
organizations, were excluded. From these organizations, secondary data were collected 
from the BM&FBOVESPA website regarding governance mechanisms whose absence of 
data resulted in 68 companies being analyzed in 2014. 
From the selected sample of 68 companies, 26 are listed on the ISE (CSI) of 
BM&FBOVESPA, which considers the aspect of corporate sustainability, based on 
economic efficiency, environmental balance, social justice and CG. It was taken into account 
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that the companies listed on the ISE use CSR as a strategy to increase the return of their 
actions (Almeida-Santos et al., 2013) or their financial performance (Bear et al., 2010). 
3.2 Collection and data analysis 
Data referring to the variables of diversity of Gender, CG and CSR were collected from the 
reference forms (RF) companies, released on the website of the BM&FBOVESPA and CVM. 
As to the financial information related to the financial performance were collected from the 
Economatica database. The dependent variables, independent and mediator of the research, 
including how to measure and empirical studies using these variables, according to a survey 
conducted in the literature, are presented in Table I. 
The selected variables include the mechanisms of governance, social responsibility index 
and performance indicators that were based on the literature. It is noteworthy that the 
gender diversity variable was considered as a mediator in the relationship between CG, CSR 
and financial performance. 
4. Presentation and analysis of results 
Initially, for the analysis of the data, it was sought to carry out the descriptive statistics of 
the variables. Therefore, it was observed that the average percentage of women on the 
corporate board (8.64 per cent) and the presence on the directors boards (36.76 per cent) are 
relatively low, seeing as, of the 68 companies analyzed, 43 have women occupying positions 
on corporate boards and 25 on the directors boards. Of these, there were a total of 110 
counselors and 27 directors. Thus, it is observed that the predominance of women who take 
up the chairs on the corporate and directors boards is higher than 20 per cent, which is 
considered the national average presented in the IBGC (2009) report. The indicators of 
economic performance that have stability when compared with the average standard 
deviation were ROA (x = 5.50 per cent, s = 0.0703), ROS (x = 9.62 per cent, s = 0.1429), and 
DL (x = 57.80 per cent, s = 0.1781). Only ROE (x =17.09 per cent, s = 0.3870) showed 
greater variability between companies. Both economic performance indicators such as 
financial performance indicators converge with the studies of Hussein and Kiwia (2009), 
Kang et al. (2010), Choi et al. (2010), and Oba and Fodio (2013). 
To test the hypothesis shown in Figure 1, seeing as each group is represented by several 
indicators, except for CSR, the TOPSIS method was used (technique for order preference by 
Figure 1. 
Research Design with 
indicators obtained 
from TOPSIS 
Analysis 
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Dimensions Code Variable Mensuration Authors  
Mediating     
Gender 
(GD) 
GDB Gender 
Diversity on 
the Board 
Percentage of Women in the 
Board Corporate 
Shrader et al. (1997), Carter et al. 
(2003), Erhardt et al. (2003), Rose 
(2007), Almeida-Santos et al. 
(2013), Oba and Fodio (2013) 
PFD Presence of 
Female 
Director 
Dummy – 1 is attributed if 
there are women occupying a 
position of board of directors 
and 0 otherwise 
Oba e Fodio (2013), Margem 
(2013) 
Independent     
CG IB Independence 
of the Board 
Number of independent 
members on the total number 
of board members 
Klapper and Love (2004), Mehdi 
(2007), Ehikioya (2009), Shan 
and Mclver (2011), Azim (2012), 
Iatridis (2013) 
SB Size of the 
Board 
Dummy – 1 is attributed the 
company that owns board of 
administration with 3 to 9 
members and 0 in the other 
situations 
Abor e Biekpe (2007), 
Christensen and Kent e Stewart 
(2010), Hsu and Petchsakulwong 
(2010), Ibrahim et al. (2010), 
Grove et al. (2011), Love (2011) 
BM Board Meetings Number of meetings of the 
board of directors in the year 
Klapper and Love (2004), 
Larcker et al. (2007), Mehdi 
(2007), Bokpin (2011), Grove 
et al. (2011) 
RB Board 
Remuneration 
Remuneration of the board/ 
total of board members 
Brown e Caylor (2009), 
Christensen, Kent e Stewart 
(2010), Grove et al. (2011), Love 
(2011), Azim (2012) 
RC Remuneration 
Committee 
Dummy – 1 is attributed to the 
company that has a 
compensation committee and 0 
the case does not have 
Klapper e Love (2004), 
Giovannini (2010), Grove et al. 
(2011), Love (2011), Azim (2012) 
AC Audit 
Committee 
Dummy – 1 is attributed to the 
company that has a audit 
committee and 0 the case does 
not have 
Klapper and Love (2004), 
Larcker et al. (2007), Cheung 
et al. (2011), Love (2011), Iatridis 
(2013) 
SC Size Committee Number of members of the 
audit committee 
Klapper and Love (2004), 
Cheung et al. (2011), Grove et al. 
(2011), Love (2011) 
CSR ISE Company 
listing on the 
CSI - ISE 
Dummy – 1 for the company 
that is listed on the CSI and 0 
otherwise 
Rezende et al. (2008), Almeida- 
Santos et al. (2013) 
Dependent     
Economic 
performance 
(ECO) 
ROA Return On 
Assets 
Net Income
Total Asset 
Filatotchev et al. (2005), Abor e 
Biekpe (2007), Nicholson e Kiel 
(2007), Ehikioya (2009), Grove 
et al. (2011), Azim (2012) 
ROE Return On 
Equity 
Net Income
Liquid Patrimony 
Filatotchev et al. (2005), Brown e 
Caylor (2009), Vieira et al. (2011), 
Azim (2012)  
(continued ) 
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similarity to ideal solution) as a multiple-criteria, decision-making technique. The variables 
were divided into five groups of analysis, namely GD, CG, CSR, ECO and FIN. 
According to Vega et al. (2014), the TOPSIS analysis considers that the variables used are 
independent and the scientific studies of this analysis should minimize the dependency 
problem or multicollinearity among the variables. However, the use of financial indicators 
can generate multicollinearity problems. In this case, factorial analysis can reduce or 
eliminate these problems to select or indicate dimensions by grouping representative 
financial indicators. (Hsu, 2013). In this case, to minimize the problem of dependence 
between variables in the TOPSIS analysis, each group was analyzed with the help of a factor 
analysis to see if there are variables that can be grouped, according to Table II. 
The first group defined as a mediating variable is the gender diversity, as expressed by 
two variables: GDB and PFD. With the aid of the factor analysis, it was found that the 
eigenvalue (FGD = 1.045 and DGD = 0.955) and per cent of variance of each factor (GDB and 
PFD = 52.24 per cent = 47.76 per cent) were similar, demonstrating that this group can be 
represented by two dimensions. To increase the robust conclusion of low dependence 
between variables, the indicator VIF (variance inflation factor) was calculated with a 
reference of null dependency being equal to 1.000 (MAROCO, 2011). Because the VIF 
maximum variable group is 1.001 and the correlation between DGB and PFD is low 
(Pearson = 0.03), the two variables for analysis were preserved TOPSIS (Table II). 
The second group, defined as an independent variable, is related to CG variables. With a 
maximum VIF of 5,411, indicating multicollinearity between the variables, the numbers, 
with the help of the factor analysis, were reduced. The dimensions indicated by the 
eigenvalue (dim1 = 2,017; dim2 = 1,551; dim3 = 1.019; dim4 = 0.916; dim5 = 0.831) and 
percentage of explanatory variance (dim1 = 28.82, dim2 = 22.16, dim3 = 14.52, dim4 = 13.09 
and dim5 = 11.87 per cent) were defined according to the similarity between the third and 
fifth dimension. Based on the inflection of the sedimentation graph, it is concluded that this 
group can be represented by five representative dimensions of CG. 
Dimensions Code Variable Mensuration Authors  
ROS Return on Sales Net Income
Liquid Sales 
Fan et al. (2007), Kajola (2008), 
Azam et al. (2011), Nheri (2013) 
DL Debt Levels CL þ NCL
Total Asset 
All Al Farooque et al. (2007), 
Chen and Lin (2007), Campbell 
et al. (2011), Vieira et al. (2011), 
Iatridis (2013) 
Financial 
performance 
(FIN) 
RD Return of 
Dividends 
Dividends per share
Market price of the shares 
Maury (2006), Basu et al. (2007), 
Chen and Li (2010), Correia, 
Amaral e Louvet (2011), Vieira 
et al. (2011) 
MB Market to Book Market price of the shares
Book value of shares 
Filatotchev et al. (2005), All Al 
Farooque et al. (2007), Renders 
et al. (2010), Azim (2012) 
Q Q de Tobin VMAþ D
Total Asset 
Kent et al. (2010), Ibrahim and 
Samad (2011), Love (2011), San 
Martin-Reyna and Duran- 
Encalada (2010) 
Source: Authors    Table I. 
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Therefore, the AC and SC variables were transformed into a variable (CG1) with a loading 
factor of 0.972, while the SB and RB variables were transformed in the second variable (CG2) 
with a factor load of 0.814. The other variables, because of their low multicollinearity, kept 
the original ones, which were IB, BM and RC. Thus, relative the control group with the 
recoded variables presented VIF maximum 1.092, which indicates that the multicollinearity 
problem for TOPSIS analysis was minimized. In this case, the CG group with the recoded 
variables had a maximum VIF of 1.092, which indicates that the problem of multicollinearity 
for the TOPSIS analysis was minimized. As a result, it was judged that the new recoded 
variables did not need an orthogonal factor rotation, seeking to preserve the recoded 
variables as close as possible to the original ones. 
The independent variable CSR, being represented by a single variable, had no need for 
recoding. The third group of variables, defined as a variable dependent on the 
organizational performance, was divided into economic performance and financial 
performance. 
The economic performance subgroup is composed of the variables ROA, ROE, ROS and 
END. Through the factor analysis, two dimensions were identified and defined as ECO1 
(grouping ROA and ROS) and ECO2 (ROE and END). The first dimension, defined as ECO1, 
consists of ROA and ROS (eigenvalue = 2.115 and percentage of variance = 52.88 per cent) 
with a resulting factor loading of 0.938. The second dimension includes ROE and END 
(1,212 eigenvalue and percentage of variance = 30.30 per cent) with a resulting factor 
loading of 0.782. Since the recoded variables, the maximum VIF was established at 1.011 
and is considered a low multicollinearity between variables. 
Table II.  
Grouping variables 
and Pearson 
correlation   
Var. C�od. 
VIF 
Initial 
Factorial Loads of Recoded Variables as input TOPSIS 
GD CG 
CSR 
ECO FIN 
GDB PFD CG1 CG2 IB RC BM ECO1 ECO2 FIN1 MB  
Mediating                
Gender   1 GDB   1.001   1.000              
2 PFD   1.001    1.000           
Independent                
Governance   3 IB   1.044       1.000          
4 SB   1.224      0.814           
5 BM   1.168         1.000        
6 RB   1.172      0.814           
7 RC   1.081        1.000         
8 AC   5.323     0.972            
9 SC   5.411     0.972          
CSR   10 ISE   1.000          1.000     
Dependent                
Perf. Econ.   11 ROA   2.528           0.938      
12 ROE   1.290            0.782     
13 ROS   2.509           0.938      
14 END   1.466            0.782   
Perf. Fin.   15 RD   1.228             0.843    
16 MB   1.003              1.000   
17 Q   1.225             0.847  
VIF of Coded variables   1.001   1.001   1.055   1.071   1.021   1.061   1.092   1.000   1.011   1.011   1.001   1.001  
Source: Research data   
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Likewise, the financial performance subgroup comprises the RD, Q and MB variables 
with multicollinearity indicated by a VIF maximum of 1,225 which was reduced to two 
dimensions. The first dimension is formed by the indicators RD and Q (eigenvalue = 1.433 
and percentage of variance = 47.75 per cent) and called FIN1, with a factor loading of 0.845. 
The second dimension (eigenvalue = 0.998 and per cent of variance = 33.27 per cent) is 
composed only by the indicator MB for which the original value was maintained. Since the 
ones with recoded variables are indicated by a VIF maximum of 1,001, it was judged not 
necessary to have an orthogonal rotation between dimensions. 
Seeing as the purpose of encoding is to reduce multicollinearity indicated between 
variables, the maximum VIF of 1,092 found indicates that the recoding variables shown are 
suitable for TOPSIS analysis. 
The relationships between the variables of the search model were obtained by a set of 
five linear equations. Maroco (2011, p. 761) states that “the analysis of mediating variables 
can be done by using simple linear regressions to evaluate the significance of the relations 
expressed in the points” of the research model. First, the mediation was verified by the 
statistical relationship between the independent variables (CG and CSR) and the mediating 
variable (GD), according to equation (1). Subsequently, the relationship between the 
independent variables (CG and CSR) and whether the mediator variable (GD) corroborates to 
explain the dependent variable (ECO and FIN) was tested in equations 2 and 3. Finally, the 
relationship between the independent (CG and CSR) and dependent variables (ECO and FIN) 
without the variable mediator was tested according to equations 4 and 5: 
GD ¼ b 0þb 1CG þ b 2CSR (1)   
ECO¼ b 0þ b 1GDþ b 2CGþ b 3CSR (2)   
FIN ¼ b 0þb 1GD þ b 2CG þ b 3CSR (3)   
ECO ¼ b 0þb 1CG þ b 2CSR (4)   
FIN ¼ b 0þb 1CG þ b 2CSR (5)  
The results of the models, the values of standardized coefficients and their significance and 
other indicators related to the regression are shown in Table III. 
Observing the F-test with p-value # 0.10, equations 1, 2 and 3 have “at least one of the 
independent variables with significant effect on the dependent variable” (Maroco, 2011, 
p. 681). To see if more than one independent variable influences the dependent variable, and 
therefore support or reject the hypotheses, the significant coefficients with p-value # 0.10 
were considered. 
To test H1, if the CSR is positively related to the economic performance of Brazilian 
companies, the relationship between CSR was calculated, eliminating the effect of influence 
of CG (equation 4) in ECO performance and resulting in a relation that remains positive and 
not significant (p-value = 0.661). Therefore, H1 is rejected. 
As for H2, if the CSR is positively related to financial performance of Brazilian 
companies, it was found that the relationship of CSR eliminating the effect of CG (EQ5), the 
financial performance. The relationship is negative and insignificant (p-value = 0.243), so 
H2 is rejected. 
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Regarding H3, if the CG is positively related to the economic performance of Brazilian 
companies, it was found that the ratio is positive and no significant interaction with CRS 
(equation 4) (p-value = 0.992). Therefore, H3 is also rejected. 
To test H4, if the CG is positively related to financial performance of Brazilian 
companies, the relationship is positive, but not significant (equation 5) (p-value = 0.483). In 
this case, H4 was also rejected. 
The following hypotheses tested the influence of mediation of gender diversity. 
The analysis is presented in three steps. First, the relationship between the independent 
variable and the mediator variable was verified, second, between the mediator variable and 
the dependent variable and third, if the presence of a mediator variable in the model reduces 
the importance of the independent variable (Maroco, 2011). 
As for H5, if gender diversity explains the positive relationship between CSR and 
economic performance of Brazilian companies, it was found that the relationship between 
the independent variable CSR and the mediator variable GD (equation 1) is positive and not 
significant (p-value = 0.642). Although the relationship between the mediator GD and the 
dependent variable ECO (EQ2) is positive and significant (p-value = 0.034) in an allusion to 
trajectory analysis (Maroco, 2011), H5 is not supported. It corroborates for this conclusion 
the fact that the explanatory power of the CSR variable in the model with mediation 
(equation 2 = 0.093) did not change significantly (equation 4 = 0.084) when without 
mediation. 
Similar to the previous case, H6 states that if gender diversity explains the positive 
relationship between CSR and financial performance of Brazilian companies, it was found 
that the relationship between the independent variable CSR and the mediating variable GD 
(EQ 0.1) is positive and not significant (p-value = 0.642), and even if the relationship between 
the mediator GD and the dependent variable FIN (EQ3) is positive and significant (p-value = 
0.054) the hypothesis is not supported. Confirming the conclusion, the coefficient (b = 
  0.173) with mediation (equation 3) did not change the explanatory power of CSR variable 
in the model significantly (b =   0.149) when without mediation (equation 5). 
For H7, if the gender diversity explains the positive relationship between the CG and 
the ECO (economic performance) of Brazilian companies, it was found that the path between 
the independent variable CG (equation 1) and variable mediator (p-value = 0.005); and the 
mediator variable (EQ2) and economic performance (p-value = 0.034) is positive and 
significant. Therefore, H7 is supported. The conclusion is reinforced, seeing as the F-test and 
Table III.  
Analysis of 
regression indicators 
obtained with 
TOPSIS analysis  
VAR 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
b stand. p-value b stand. p-value b stand. p-value b stand. p-value b stand. p-value  
GD – –   0.281   0.034   0.255   0.054 – – – – 
CG   0.340   0.005   0.047   0.715     0.058   0.657   0.001   0.992   0.089   0.483 
CSR   0.055   0.642   0.093   0.448     0.173   0.162   0.084   0.661     0.149   0.243 
Dependent GD ECO FIN ECO FIN  
R2   0.115   0.097   0.069     0.025   0.031 
Test F   2.853   2.172   2.555   0.057   0.966 
Sig.   0.066   0.100   0.064   0.945   0.387 
VIF Máx   1.008   1.259   1.259   1.000   1.001 
p-value Teste KS   0.118   0.786   0.242   0.564   0.225  
Source: Research data   
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the statistical relationship between CG and ECO without the mediating variable GD 
(equation 4) is insignificant (p-value = 0.992). Thus, the mediating variable carries the effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Maroco, 
2011). 
Finally, for H8, if the gender diversity explains the positive relationship between the CG 
and the financial performance of Brazilian companies, it was found that the path between 
the independent variable CG (equation 1), the variable mediator (p-value = 0.005); and the 
mediator variable (equation 3) and financial performance (p-value = 0.054) is positive and 
significant. Seeing as the relationship between CG and FIN (equation 5) is negative and 
insignificant (p-value = 0.483), the mediating variable carries the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable, and therefore, H8 is supported. 
The summary description of the assumptions, supporting equations, statistical 
relationship and conclusion of the assumptions are described in Table IV. 
Non-significant results for H1 and H2 are supported by the findings of Chrysostom et al. 
(2011) and Makni et al. (2009). It differs from the results of Orlitzky et al. (2003), Tsoutsoura 
(2008), Choi et al. (2010), Aguinis and Glavas (2012) and Wang et al. (2015), who found a 
positive relationship between CSR and performance. 
One of the first studies to analyze this relationship in an emerging market (Brazil) was 
performed by Cris�ostomo et al. (2011). Keeping in mind the characteristics of the Brazilian 
market, the authors point out that the set of social stakeholders is still not be able to strongly 
consider the CSR as a decision criterion in their consumption and investment alternatives, 
and that for the Brazilian companies, the CSR is incapable of contributing positively to the 
financial performance of a company, seeing as that the predominant view is that expenses 
on CSR are a diversion of resources from the main activity of the company. 
While companies have characteristics or determinants of CG that are defended by the 
literature as favorable to a good financial and environmental performance, as environmental 
investments (Waddock and Graves, 1997) and gender diversity (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012) 
these features were not decisive in the companies analyzed. 
It should be noted that the CSR was measured by means of the CSI, in which it is 
considered that the companies that are part of the index adopt practices of CSR formally 
among the other management policies and have differentiated characteristics of CG. The 
other companies, not part of the index, that were analyzed may also adopt CSR practices, but 
it is considered that they may not use their practices to increase performance and would 
have a lower likelihood of CSR being positively related to economic and financial 
Table IV.  
Conclusion summary 
of assumptions  
Assumptions 
Positive relationship 
predicted by 
hypothesis 
Equations 
support 
Sign of 
statistics 
relationship 
Significance of 
the statistical 
relationship Conclusion  
H1 CSR $ ECO EQ4 þ Not significant Rejected 
H2 CSR $ FIN EQ5   Not significant Rejected 
H3 CG $ ECO EQ4 þ Not significant Rejected 
H4 CG $ FIN EQ5   Not significant Rejected 
H5 CSR $ GD $ ECO EQ1; EQ2, EQ4 þþþ Not significant Rejected 
H6 CSR $ GD $ FIN EQ1; EQ3; EQ5 þþ   Not significant Rejected 
H7 CG $ GD $ ECO EQ1, EQ2, EQ4 þþþ Significant Supported 
H8 CG $ GD $ FIN EQ1; EQ3; EQ5 þþþ Significant Supported  
Source: Authors   
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performance. In general, these companies are assumed to have lower adoption levels of CSR 
practices than those belonging to the CSI, and although they are listed on the stock 
exchange, they do not belong to the index. 
Non-significant results for the H3 and H4 are supported by the results of studies by 
Alves and Mendes (2004) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008). They diverge from the ones 
defended by Erhardt et al. (2003), Judge et al. (2003), Silveira et al. (2003), Carter et al. (2003), 
Klapper and Love (2004), Hussein and Kiwia (2009) and Oba and Fodio (2013). Thus, it 
appears that in relation to the sample studied, the presence of women on corporate boards 
does not signal to stakeholders that the company pays attention to minorities, or that, in 
social terms, it is different from others, contrary to what was presented by Bear et al. (2010). 
The sample companies, that have women holding positions in corporate boards and 
participating in environmental rankings, are not likely to develop the best CSR practices. 
Non-significant findings for H5 and H6 in line findings from Shrader et al. (1997), Rose 
(2007) and Margem (2013). Different from the literature regarding the influence of the 
participation of women on corporate boards in relation to CSR (Hillman et al., 2000; Singh 
et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2010), since the number of women in corporate boards does not reflect 
in improvement in CSR practices, or even in different social and environmental performance. 
The positive results found in the link proposed by H7 and H8 assumptions are in line 
with the findings of Carter et al. (2003), Erhardt et al. (2003) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008). The findings are also in line with the assumptions of Kin et al. (2009) that a more 
diverse board of directors may experience a better monitoring of managers, because of the 
increase of their independence and improved performance. Thus, it is suggested that gender 
diversity in management positions could lead to better CG in organizations (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). 
In addition to the summary of the conclusions related to the hypotheses described in 
Table II, the following is a comparative outline of the results found in the present research 
with results of similar studies carried out in the context of different countries, aiming to 
expand the international discussion on the theme, according to Table V. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
This research examined the influence of gender diversity in the relationship between CSR, 
CG and the financial performance of Brazilian public companies. 
It was found that, out of the 68 companies analyzed, 43 have women occupying positions 
in corporate boards and 25 on the board of directors. The proportion of women who make up 
the corporate board and the directors board is in line with the national average, being higher 
than 20 per cent, according to the IBGC (2009) report, although this percentage is lower than 
the average of other countries, such as Sweden, for example, who has at least a woman 
representative in 100 per cent of the companies. (IBGC, 2009). 
The results show that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity as a 
mediator of the relationship between CG and economic and financial performance, in which 
H7 and H8 were accepted. Although CSR is part of a set of principles of good CG, there is a 
distance from the other attributes of governance. In the analyzed case, there is relation to the 
presence of women on corporate and directors boards with corporate performance. 
It is assumed that, in the case of the analyzed companies, there are no differences in the 
performance of women as members of corporate and director boards, in terms of 
encouraging CSR practices, nevertheless, it was observed in terms of corporate governance. 
It is assumed that this result is because of the fact that the participation of women on 
corporate boards is recent in Brazil, in the sense that their involvement in the definition and 
disclosure of environmental actions is small. This is true to the extent that the companies 
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Hypothesis Authors Sample/ Country Conclusions/ Possible explanations  
H1 and H2 Cris�ostomo 
et al. (2011) 
78 Brazilian 
companies in the 
period of  
2001-2006 
The results indicate a negative effect of the CSR on the 
creation of value for companies, and a neutral relationship 
between CSR and company profitability. This negative 
influence can be explained by the relationship with 
employees and environmental action, or by greater 
pressure exerted by stakeholders strongly concerned with 
maximizing company value 
Makni et al. 
(2009) 
179 Canadian 
companies in the 
period of  
2004-2005 
The results show that corporate social initiatives lead to 
such as environmental programs lead to poor short-term 
performance. Because of the relatively small size of 
Canadian companies when compared to US companies, for 
example, environmental initiatives are very costly and do 
not seem to be considered as solid investments by the 
Canadian market. Government subsides may be required 
to offset the short-term negative impact on financial 
performance in these companies. In addition, socially 
responsible companies have lower profits and reduced 
shareholder wealth, which in turn limits socially 
responsible investments 
H3 and H4 Alves and 
Mendes 
(2004) 
144 Portuguese 
companies in the 
year of 1990 
Analyzing jointly the practices of CG verified that there is 
no significant relation with the performance of the 
companies. They also found a negative relationship 
between disclosure of information about company policy 
and returns. In general, they emphasize the need to adopt 
governance practices related to the board in the 
organizations 
Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) 
American 
companies in the 
period of  
2000-2003 
The authors did not find a significant relationship between 
CG and corporate performance. In addition, they found that 
board independence has a negative relation to 
performance, suggesting that independent board members 
may be useful in disciplining and monitoring the board, 
but not in performance. They point out that in those 
organizations that have independent members on the 
board for the purpose of improving performance, this does 
not occur. However, if the purpose is to discipline the 
management of under-performing companies, the 
independence of the board may contribute to the change of 
results 
H5 and H6 Shrader et al. 
(1997) 
200 American 
companies in the 
period of  
1992-1993 
The results suggest that a higher percentage of women in 
management or on the board of directors are 
disproportionately associated with higher financial 
performance. A higher percentage of women in high 
management positions negatively influence the 
performance of companies. One possible reason for this 
conclusion may be the fact that there is no sufficient 
“critical mass” of women at the highest levels of 
management to have a relevant impact on company 
decisions, since women in high management/ leadership 
positions constitute only 4.5% of the teams in the 
companies. They also verified that women hold high-level 
jobs positions for a short time  
(continued ) 
Table V. 
Comparative 
Summary of Results  
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Hypothesis Authors Sample/ Country Conclusions/ Possible explanations  
Rose (2007) Every Danish 
company listed 
in the 
Copenhagen 
stock market in 
the period of 
1998-2001 
The results show that the gender measured by the 
percentage of women who make up the council does not 
influence the performance of the companies. This result 
may be explained by the fact that the former board 
members have a traditional view of management and may 
suppress any “special” features of non-board members. 
Thus, there may be a socialization process where 
unconventional board members (women) have adopted the 
behavior and standards of conventional business leaders, 
and may be the only way to be considered qualified in the 
eyes of key decision makers and other stakeholders. As a 
consequence, the gains of existing female members in the 
council are not reflected in any measure of performance 
chosen 
Margem 
(2013) 
658 Brazilian 
companies in the 
period of  
2002-2009 
The author verified that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of women on the board 
of directors and management positions to the value of 
companies, but there is a negative relationship between the 
presence of women in the board and the performance of 
companies 
H7 and 
H8 
Carter et al. 
(2003) 
638 companies in 
the year of 1999 
They analyzed the relationships between CG, gender 
diversity in the board of directors and the value of 
companies and found positive relationships between the 
presence of women or minorities in the board and the value 
of the company, with Q. de Tobin 
Erhardt et al. 
(2003) 
112 companies in 
the period of 
1993-1998 
The results supported the hypothesis that the diversity in 
the executive board is positively associated with the return 
on investment and the return on assets. Thus, the diversity 
on boards has a positive impact on overall organizational 
performance. The authors suggest that diversity can be 
associated with the effectiveness in the supervisory role of 
boards of directors, as one of the central issues of CG is the 
degree to which a CEO may have influence on the board of 
directors. In addition, greater gender diversity in boards 
provides a broader base of information and perspectives 
and can contribute more effectively to the decision-making 
process, creating value and improving performance 
Campbell 
and 
Mínguez- 
Vera (2008) 
68 Spanish 
companies in the 
period of  
1995-2000 
They found a positive effect of gender diversity in the 
board on firm performance. The results suggest that, at the 
very least, an increase in gender diversity can be achieved 
without destroying the firm’s value to Spanish 
shareholders or investors, that is, investors can positively 
assess the contributions made by female directors. In 
general, they verified that investors in Spain do not 
penalize companies that increase the participation of 
women directors and that greater gender diversity can 
generate economic gains. They also believe that the 
positive discrimination in favor of women’s commitments 
recommended in Spain’s 2006 Unified Governance Code 
should persist as a feature of the CG scenario 
Source: Authors    Table V. 
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analyzed have an average of 8.64 per cent of women occupying positions in the board of 
directors and 36.76 per cent in executive positions. 
Thus, it appears that the actions developed by counselors and directors are directed to 
CSR practices because of instrumental reasons like the increase in financial results and not 
because of ethical issues or greater sensitivity to environmental issues (Aguinis and Glavas, 
2012). Moreover, it is assumed that a more diverse board of directors may experience a 
better monitoring of managers because of the increase of their independence and better 
performance (Kin et al., 2009; Carter et al., 2010). 
Overall, the results of this research have several implications on three main issues. For 
gender diversity, it is suggested that the number of women occupying top positions in 
councils is not enough to positively influence Brazilian companies to develop better CSR 
practices. This result can be explained by the length of time in the position, by adopting a 
behavior similar to (previous) members of the boards or because it is a particular 
characteristic of the Brazilian market. However, it is pointed out that gender diversity 
strengthens the relationship between governance and performance, providing a broader 
base of information and perspectives for decision-making, which can add value to investors. 
For CG, the results suggest that the practices developed by Brazilian companies do not 
bring better returns, as well as the set of tested variables related to the council and directories 
do not strengthen performance. It is suggested that there is need for a change in governance 
practices related to the boards and their implementation by management organizations. 
For performance, the results suggest that firm value is determined by governance that 
includes the participation of women in councils. It is recommended that the investors 
positively evaluate the involvement of female members in the councils and/or directories 
and in the decisions made. 
The main limitation of this research was that the amount of companies analyzed, choice 
of ISE index to check the CSR variable and the metric used to verify the CG mechanisms, 
seeing as other variables, could have been used. 
It is suggested for future research to extend the sample work with other environmental 
indicators such as GRI, to make comparisons. It also recommended the inclusion of variables 
to provide a more detailed view of CG characteristics. Finally, it is advised that the 
relationship between gender diversity and CSR of the organizations to be qualitatively 
analyzed, aiming to discuss in a more detailed and in-depth way the relationship in the 
context of Brazilian companies, including the various social, environmental and dimensions 
of sustainable management. 
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